Implementation of SSL/TLS-based security mechanisms in e-commerce and e-mail applications using Java

Tulsi Pawan Fowdur, Muhammad Shafeeq Aumeeruddy, Yogesh Beeharry Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Faculty of Engineering, University of Mauritius Réduit, Mauritius

p.fowdur@uom.ac.mu, muhammad.aumeeruddy3@umail.uom.ac.mu, y.beeharry@uom.ac.mu

Abstract - E-commerce applications and e-mail communication are very popular in today's sophisticated society. However, without proper security protocols in place, these applications are susceptible to different types of attacks. The Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack for example is becoming an increasing threat for e-mail and e-commerce applications. Spoofing attacks are also a major issue for e-mail applications. In this paper, a review of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols is performed along with some common security attacks for both applications. Firstly, a Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and HTTP Secure (HTTPS) web server was implemented for the e-commerce application using Java. The HTTPS server employs the SSL/TLS protocol and uses a cryptographic self-signed certificate in order to secure messages between the client and the server. The e-mail application was implemented using the Javamail API. It was secured using the TLS protocol to address MITM attacks on e-mail. The MITM attack was performed using the Wireshark software by sniffing data. With the SSL/TLS protocol enabled, data transmitted was encrypted and MITM attack was successfully blocked. Spoofing attacks were also tested and tackled with the SSL/TLS protocol.

Keywords: Man-In-the-Middle attack, SSL, TLS, Javamail.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this modern era, e-commerce and e-mail communication have become an integrated part in the world of businesses and consumers. E-commerce permits consumers to exchange goods and services by the medium of the internet with no barriers of time or distance and e-mail permits correspondence between any individual around the globe [1]. According to an e-mail statistic report published by Radicati group, the total number of worldwide e-mail accounts has increased from 4.9 to 5.2 billion e-mail accounts between 2017 and 2018, and by the end of 2019, it will be increased to about 5.5 billion e-mail accounts [2]. As stated in Statistia, a business intelligence portal, sales using e-commerce approximated to around 2.3 trillion US dollars is expected to increase to 4.88 trillion US dollars in 2021 [3]. Despite all the

benefits that e-commerce and e-mail provide to businesses and consumers, cyber security remains one of the most crucial aspects to be handled while exchanging information which can result into potential damage for both parties. E-mail applications are exposed to threats and vulnerabilities such as e-mail spoofing, phishing attacks, social engineering, e-mail spamming, transmission of malware and viruses. In addition, e-commerce applications are also susceptible to dangers such as phishing, MITM Attack, and network sniffing attacks. In 2016, Alibaba's Taobao ecommerce website was attacked by hackers where they gained access to over 20 million accounts which resulted in a great loss for the company [4]. If data are being transmitted over a network insecurely, an attacker may get access to these data. Consequently, the substance of e-mail messages and attachments may be intercepted and viewed by an attacker. A small attack from an attacker may infect a host with malware, allowing interception of e-mail messages and exfiltration of sensitive information [5]. Securing applications is the use of software, hardware, and procedural methods to protect applications against dangers. E-mail and e-commerce applications utilize a lot of security mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security/ Secure Socket Layer, Pretty Good Privacy encryption, Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, Sender Policy Framework record, Domain Keys Indentified Mail, SenderID. An overview of research conducted on e-mail and e-commerce security is given next.

In [6], a demonstration of the use of the SSL protocol to secure e-commerce, banking and other business applications required to exchange data was provided. The protocol was exerted to secure millions of data every second during online transactions or when transmitting confidential information over the Internet. In [7] the author investigated the connections between SMTP servers over the Transport Security Layer (TLS). The cipher suites, certificates and certificate authority used, and the behavior of email providers were considered when communicating with improperly secured e-mail servers. Recently in 2016 [8], the author conducted a security analysis over the SSL protocol. Due to lack of adequate cryptographic

encryption techniques, PKI infrastructure and digital signature, intruders may have access to sensitive information in an e-commerce environment. To avoid MITM attack on the SSL protocol, front end authentication, back end authentication and the recognition of forged Certificate Authority were proposed. In [9], the author focused on the possible attacks on SSL over HTTP known as HTTPS protocol. The most popular e-mail services and online transactions rely mostly on HTTPS to provide end-toend security. The Diffie-Hellman and blowfish algorithms were further added to enhance the SSL over HTTPS. In [10], a description of the use of some SMTP security extensions; STARTTLS, Sender Policy Framework, DomainKeys Indentified Mail and Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance for confidentiality of e-mail was given. The STARTTLS extension encapsulates SMTP within a TLS session. The client is able to transmit messages and attachments over an encrypted path. The DKIM allows the SMTP server to know whether an e-mail is spoofed or not during transmission. SPF permits a range of hosts that are authorized to send mail for its domain. DMARC assembled on DKIM and SPF senders to suggest a protocol enables for authenticating the received mail. In [11], the author used the technique of memory forensics to detect if a client has received any spoofed e-mail. The memory forensics approach also detects if a client has replied to any spoofed e-mails. The memory on the client machine is often analyzed on a scheduled basis to check for spoofing attacks. If spoofing attacks are detected, the log files stored on the memory may be used by cybercrimes investigation for inspection. The Identity-Based cryptography concept to secure e-mail systems was introduced in [12]. The technique was applied to three schemes: client encryption to third party, mail server encryption before transmission and industry private network SM9 encrypting alliance. The three solutions were compared for reconstruction of a secure e-mail system. In [13], the author discussed about the confidential information being transferred when carrying out e-commerce transactions. The different threats to e-commerce applications and the technologies used to counter them were discussed. In [14], the authors designed a web-based client oriented anti-spoofing mechanism to detect, monitor and control e-mail spoofing. When a spoofed e-mail is detected, an alert message is displayed. The authors made us of the SSL protocol to counteract spoofing attacks.

Although several works have shown the efficiency of the SSL/TLS protocol, few have focused on its implementation using the Java Secure Socket Extension. The JSSE allows the implementation of secure sockets for both servers and clients. Moreover the JavaMail Application Programming Interface allows flexibility in designing the e-mail applications for testing security attacks. This paper provides a detailed overview of the implementation of a secure ecommerce and e-mail application using the TLS/SSL protocols in Java. The application was tested with both MITM and spoofing attacks. This paper is organized in the following way: Section II gives an overview of the SSL security mechanism and security attacks on ecommerce and e-mail applications. Section III describes the application of SSL to counteract security attacks. Section IV describes the implementation and testing of the developed application. Section V concludes the paper.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE SSL SECURITY MECHANISM AND SECURITY ATTACKS ASSOCIATED WITH E-COMMERCE AND E-MAIL APPLICATIONS.

The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol predecessor of the Transport Laver Protocol (TLS) was invented by Netscape in 1994 (Version 1.0) as a solution to the increasing concerns over internet security. The goal was to establish an encrypted path between the client and the server platforms. In 2003, Netscape additionally exploited new encryption plans, by using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), regarded as being more robust than the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [15]. The AES was chosen by the U.S government to protect classified information and is said to suffice to serve the purpose of protecting classified information up to the SECRET level [16]. Updates have been made and SSL version (3.0) is now operable on almost all web servers and with its popularity, it has become a standard. During the development of SSL version 3.0, developers were also creating SSL certificates. The genuineness of websites is approved by these certificates.

The SSL protocol employs a series of cryptographic processes to secure transmission of data. It gives a secure improvement to the standard TCP/IP sockets protocol used in Internet communications. Figure 1 illustrates the location of the SSL/TLS layer [17].



Figure 1. Location of SSL

The SSL/TLS protocol is used as a transport layer security control. This layer ensures confidentiality and integrity of data and peer authentication. The goals of using the SSL protocol are that it is efficient and utilizes a combination of cryptographic procedures. The public key cryptography and secret key are adopted to authenticate, and digital signatures are made to provide privacy and data integrity [17].

E-commerce and e-mail applications are exposed to different attacks. In this paper, emphasis is laid upon Man-In-The-Middle attack and spoofing attack. A MITM attack occurs when a third party in a communication environment between two hosts intercepts data in order to change it or modify it. The two hosts believe they are communicating with each other, while an attacker is intercepting all data in order to alter it or change it. The attacker may gain important information like login credentials for a website, important financial information or messages exchanged between two parties [18]. Figure 2 illustrates the MITM attack.



Figure 2. MITM attack.

During an HTTP transaction between two hosts on a network, there is a TCP connection. In a MITM attack, the connection is split into two parts. The first part leads the victim to the attacker, while the second part leads the attacker to a server [19]. An interception process is done before the user's network traffic reaches its destination. It passes through the attacker's network traffic. The most credulous way an attacker does a passive MITM attack is by setting a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot which is available to the public. Once the victim connects to the hotspot, the attacker gains full visibility to any online data exchanged [20]. The main technique used to perform MITM attack is sniffing of packets. Attackers use packet capturing tools like Wireshark to carry out such attacks. The sniffing tool is used to capture confidential information on a network. Wireshark is a free, commercial-quality sniffer program. It comes with a GUI and runs on multiple platform: Windows, Linux, Mac OS X. It can decode over 400 protocols. Other examples of sniffing tools are: TCPDUMP, Nmap and Cain and Abel [21, 22].

Spoofing attacks on e-mails occur when an attacker sends a recipient an e-mail using another e-mail address, that is, not the originating address. It is possible to perform such an attack due to the SMTP protocol. This type of attack happens when the authentication process is not respected [23]. The attacker manipulates the e-mail header (the 'From' field) to make the e-mail appear legitimate [24].

The SSL/TLS protocol is employed to provide security on web applications and e-mail applications. On web applications, the security protocol is combined with the HTTP protocol to provide secure communication between users resulting in HTTP over SSL/TLS which is the HTTPS protocol. The protocol enables users to securely access and interact with their online accounts, and protects, among other things, common user authentication credentials, such as passwords and cookies. In e-mail applications, the TLS/SSL protocol is used to encrypt data being transmitted and allows a client to authenticate with a server [25].

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF E-COMMERCE AND E-MAIL APPLICATION

This section gives details about the implementation of the e-commerce and e-mail applications.

III.1 The E-Commerce Application

A GUI was designed for the HTTP and HTTPS web server on the NetBeans IDE and is shown in Figure 3.

<u>\$</u>		-		Х
	E-Commerce Application			
			_	
	Start WebServer on port 800			
	Chat MakCasterwith COL on part 000			
	Start WebSelver with SSL on port and			

Figure 3. Java Web Server Application

The "Start WebServer on port 800" button starts the server on HTTP port 800 and the client will have access to the unsecure web page. The "Start WebServer with SSL on port 900" allows the exchange of certificates between the server and client hence providing secure connection. The exit button is located on the top right upper corner to exit the application. An overview of the methods implemented for the application is given in Figures 4 and 5.



Figure 4. Java methods structure for HTTP server



Figure 5. Java class structure for HTTPS server Java methods structure for the HTTPS server

The start web browser button relies on several methods to function. After a socket is created to communicate, the Socket.accept() function is used to listen to a connection to be made to this socket. When a client connects to the socket, it accepts the connection. The BufferedReader() is combined with the InputStream() method to accept user input, for example when a client is sending information to the server. The BufferedReader() allows sending characters instead of bytes. To send bytes to the client, means the getOutputStream() method is used. However, it can be combined with PrintWriter() to be able to send text to a remote application. The printWriter.print() will print the strings. Here this method will output an HTML page to the web browser of a client.

The start web brower with SSL shown in Figure 5 provides secure communication. Different methods are used to obtain an SSL connection. The keystore.load() function is used to access the server and the client, certificated by using the FileInputStream() method. The Trustmanagerfactory.getInstance() method manages the type of trust material used by the secure socket. SSLserverSocket.getSupportedCipherSuites() The method allows to choose the cipher suites to be used by the server. It selects the strongest cipher suites to be used by the server. The SSLserversocket.accept() listens to the connection and accepts any trusted incoming connection.

An HTML form was designed for the e-commerce application where the user can input information as shown in Figure 6. The form consists of three labels and three input elements. The input elements are of type text. The "text" creates a basic single-line text field. The width for the input is of length 20 characters. A button of type submit is also included and named "Buy Now". This button submits the data to the server. The HTML form was written and tested on a source code editor called Notepad++.



Figure 6. HTML form

After testing the form, it is embedded in the web browser program. The Printwriter() method is combined with the OutputStream() method to output the HTML form to the client. To accept the user input, a BufferedReader() is combined with an InputStreamReader() to send data back to the server. The flowchart shown in Figure 7 illustrates the operation of the HTTP server application.



Figure 7. Flowchart for HTTP server

When the HTTP server is started, it waits for a client to connect to it. If the client provides the correct port number to connect, he will get access to the web page, else the connection to the server is refused. When the client is connected, the Printwriter() method will output the HTML form on the client web browser. When the client inputs details and submits the form, the Bufferedreader() method will send the data in the form of text to the web server. Once the client has finished, the socket is closed. The flowchart shown in Figure 8 illustrates the operation of the HTTPS server application.



Figure 8. Flowchart for HTTPS server

When the HTTPS server is started, it waits for a client to connect to it on port 900. When a client connects to it, the SSL handshake is started. The client sends the server information about the SSL version it uses and also a list of cipher suites. The server chooses the highest version of SSL and the best cipher suite to be used. The certificates are exchanged and the server certifies the certificates. The secret keys are exchanged and the client asks for a change in cipher specification. In the next step, the server tells the client to change the encrypted mode, the SSL handshake is terminated and ready to send data securely. The server and the client send data and receive data using the same scheme as in the HTTP server.

SSL/TLS needs to be implemented for secure communication and is accomplished in several steps. For the creation of certificates, a tool known as keytool will be used. It is available in the JDK software.

Four different certificates will be generated namely:

- 1. One keystore for the server
- 2. One keystore for the client
- 3. One truststore for the server
- 4. One truststore for the client

he keystore file contains the private keys and the icates with the corresponding public keys. The ion for the keystore file for the server is shown in e 9.

Program Files\Java\jre1.8.0_131\bin>keytool -genkey -alias Myserver1.0 -keyalg | -validity 1825 -keystore C:\Users\user\Desktop\Myserver1_0.jks er keystore password: enter new password: t is your first and last name? Jnknown]: shafeeq t is the name of your organizational unit? Jnknown]: bn t is the name of your organization? Jnknown]: bn ltd t is the name of your City or Locality? Jnknown]: guatrebornes t is the name of your State or Province? Jnknown]: plaineswilhems : is the two-letter country code for this unit? Jnknown]: mu CN=shafeeq, OU="bn ", O=bn ltd, L=quatrebornes, ST=plaineswilhems, C=mu correct? 10]: y

Figure 9. Keystore File for server

that, a certificate file is created to be distributed iblic certificate to the client. This is shown in e 10.

rogram Files\Java\jre1.8.0_131\bin>keytool -exportcert
-alias Myserver -keystore C:\keys\Myserver.jks -file C:\k
ys\Myserver.cer
nter keystore password:
ertificate stored in file <c:\keys\myserver.cer></c:\keys\myserver.cer>

Figure 10. Server's public certificate

Keystore file for the client

The creation of the keystore file for the client is shown in Figure 11.

:\Program Files\Java\jre1.8.0_131\bin>keytool -genkey -alias Myclient1.0 -keyalg RSA -validity 1825 -keystore C:\Users\user\Desktop\Myclient1 0.jks Enter keystore password: Re-enter new password: What is your first and last name? [Unknown]: shafeeq hat is the name of your organizational unit? [Unknown]: bn hat is the name of your organization? [Unknown]: bn ltd hat is the name of your City or Locality? [Unknown]: quatrebornes hat is the name of your State or Province? [Unknown]: plaineswilhems what is the two-letter country code for this unit? [Unknown]: MU s CN=shafeeq, OU=bn, O=bn ltd, L=quatrebornes, ST=plaineswilhems, C=MU correct? [no]: y Figure 11. Keystore File for client

After the creation of the keystore file for the client, a certificate file is created, that may be distributed as public certificate to the server and is illustrated in Figure 12.



In order for a two-way Authentication, the Server should recognize the client's public certificate and the client should be aware of the server's certificate. This is achieved by:

1. Adding the server certificate to the client's truststore. This is shown in Figure 13.



Figure 13. Adding Server certificate to client truststore

2. The client certificate is added to the server truststore. This is illustrated in Figure 14.

C:\Program Files\Java\jre1.8.0_131\bin>keytool -importcert -alias Myclient -keystore C:\keys\Myserver.jks -file C:\keys\Myclient.cer
Enter keystore password:
Owner: CN=shafeeq, OU=bn, O=yusra, L=plaineswilhems, ST=quatrebornes, C=mu
Issuer: CN=shafeeq, OU=bn, O=yusra, L=plaineswilhems, ST=quatrebornes, C=mu
Serial number: 12200b36
Valid from: Fri May 18 15:52:35 MUT 2018 until: Wed May 17 15:52:35 MUT 2023
Certificate fingerprints:
MD5: 66:CC:38:08:75:14:1C:9B:F4:A6:8E:40:E0:85:74:AD
SHA1: 77:07:60:06:23:03:BE:C1:67:4D:EB:48:8B:3E:B5:2F:9B:DB:11:E1
SHA256: C1:01:BD:48:04:05:FA:C6:8F:DA:72:5A:BA:3B:AB:F7:A9:6D:0B:62:E0:EF:7
2:89:49:5D:E5:A7:E4:6D:A0:1D
Signature algorithm name: SHA256withRSA
Version: 3
Extensions:
<pre>#1: ObjectId: 2.5.29.14 Criticality=false</pre>
SubjectKeyIdentifier [
Keyldentifier [
0000: 7C 41 41 75 28 B5 0A 67 9B 6B FC 03 C4 AE 9E 83 .AAu(g.k
8010: 12 95 F5 54T
rust this certificate? [no]: y
certificate was added to keystore
Figure 14. Adding client certificate to server's truststore.

The server's certificate is imported into the client's local browser. This is achieved by:

1. The local browser is opened. Here Mozilla Firefox was chosen. Navigate through the browser's option as shown in Figure 15.



2. Click on options button and navigate through the privacy and security and go to view certificates as shown in Figure 16.

 ✿ General Q Search 	Priver rigetout to serve detenden ein instreaution date for mourier communication Allow Firefox to install and run studies. View Firefox Studies Allow Firefox to send grash reports to Mozilla Learn more	mare
 Privacy & Security Firefox Account 	Security Deceptive Content and Dangerous Software Protection Image: So	
	Certificates When a server requests your personal certificate Select one automatically Select one automatically Query OCSP reponder servers to confirm the current validity of	View Certificates

3. After clicking on view certificates, select the import button to view all available certificates. This is shown in Figures 17 and 18.

			Certifi	cate Manager		
Your Certificates	People	Servers	Authorities	Others		
You have certificates fro	om these or	ganizations that i	identify you			
Certificate Name		Security Devic	ce	Serial Number	Expires On	E,
			ł			
View Back	up Ba	eckup AlL.	mport	Qoiste		

Figure 17. Importing certificates

Certificate File to Imp	ort				1
÷ → • ↑ <mark>.</mark> •	This PC > Desktop > keys		♥ Ö Search	keys	Ą
Organize 🔻 New fo	older				
- Quick accore	Name	Date modified	Туре	Size	
	A Myclient.cer	31/01/2018 23:34	Security Certificate	1 KB	
Uesktop	Myclient.jks	31/01/2018 23:41	JKS File	4 KB	
Documents	* 📮 Myserver.cer	31/01/2018 23:00	Security Certificate	1 KB	
Downloads Pictures Saved Pictures OneDrive	* 🗋 Myserverjiks * *	31/01/2018 23:46	JKS File	4 KB	
💻 This PC 🍠 Network					
Fil	e name: Myclient.cer		 ✓ All File 	is (*.*)	V
			С	pen	Cancel

Figure 18. All available certificates listed

From Figure 18, all the listed certificates are shown and the server certificate is selected.

III.2 The E-mail Application

The secure e-mail application was developed in Java with the NetBeans IDE. The application is GUI-based and is used to send and receive e-mails over an SSL/TLS connection. The GUI for the complete system is illustrated in Figure 19.

<u></u>				-		Х
Email Send	er / Receiver					
Host name:		Start TLS (True or False) :			
Port Number:			From:			
Username:						
Password :						
To:						
Subject :						
Attachment :			•		_	
Attachment Na						nbox
Message :				Mail		

Figure 19. E-mail sender and receiver GUI

To send e-mails, the application makes use of the Javamail API. Several steps are followed to send an e-mail as follows:

1. The properties are placed for the session in a properties object.

2. A mail session is started with the Session.getInstance() method.

3. A message object is then created.

4. Set the message's From: address, To: address, and subject.

5. Set the content of the message.

6. A transport is used from the session and is connected to a named host using a username and password.

7. The message is sent to recipients over the transport. The properties define the host of the mail provider, for example, if Gmail is being used, the host name will be "smtp.gmail.com". It also provides the details about the port number being used by the host and the authentication mechanism. The option for selecting the SSL/TLS connection also may be selected. The session object is used to create a new message object of type MimeMessage, since Internet e-mails are being sent. The Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions is an Internet standard that uses the format of an e-mail. After the message is created, the From and To addresses are specified and the message subject is written. The transport is used to send the message to the recipient alongside with the send() method which connects the mail server and sends the message [26].

The application allows to send attachments also. To send an attachment, means the application makes use of a MimeMultipart object. The attachment is added by the use of a Datahandler and is sent over the transport [27].

The Javamail API allows e-mails to be received and the procedures are as follows [27]:

1. The properties are set up as before to be used for the authentication

2. The authenticator is constructed to be used for connection.

3. A session object is used with the Session.getInstance() method.

4. The session's getStore() method is used to return a store.

5. Connect to the store.

6. The INBOX folder from the store is retrieved with the getFolder() method.

7. The INBOX folder is opened.

8. The messages are retrieved from the folder as an array of message objects.

9. Close the folder and the store.

The authenticator class is used to ask a user for a password and validates this password. The session asks for a store from the provider, for example a POP3 provider. The connect() method is used to connect to the store using the hostname, username and password. The folder is opened by using the open() method and messages are available to read. After reading the messages, the folder is closed using the close() method [26].

Figure 20 illustrates the Java class structure for the email application.



Figure 20. Java class structure for e-mail application

The send() method allows the user to send an e-mail. Different methods work together to provide this service. Different fields for the properties method need to be input; the hostname, the port number, use of authentication and enabling TLS connection. The session method authenticates with the e-mail provider. Next, the message needs to be built up by setting the From and To addresses as well as the subject of the message. The mimebodypart is used to send attachments.

The inbox allows a user to open and check his inbox. The properties need to be specified and are used by the authenticator class to connect to a store. A folder is opened so as to retrieve the contents. The messages are retrieved by the multipart function where each message is stored in an array of messages. After the messages are retrieved, the folders and the store are closed.

The system flowchart for sending e-mail is illustrated in Figure 21.



Figure 21. System flowchart to send e-mail

When the program is started, the user inputs details about username, passwords and composes the message. If the startTLS command is enabled, the TLS handshake is performed with the e-mail provider and the message is sent encrypted. If the command is not enabled, the message is sent in plain text to the mail provider.

The system flowchart for receiving e-mail is shown in Figure 22.



Figure 22. System flowchart for receiving e-mail

When the program is started, the user inputs details about the port number, hostnames, user login and password. If correct information is input, the user is authenticated with the server and can have access to his respective inbox.

IV. TESTING AND ANALYSIS

In this section, the operation of both e-commerce and e-mail applications are illustrated and tested.

IV.1 E-Commerce Application Testing

The HTTP server is enabled by clicking on the button "start web server" as shown on the Figure 23.



Figure 23. GUI for e-commerce application

The user can access the web page by inserting the following address in the browser: http://localhost:800. Figure 24 illustrates the web page:

localhost:800/	× +
← → ♂ û	i localhost:800
E-Commerce	
Item Details:	
Amount:	
Credit Card Number:	
Buy Now	

Figure 24. Accessing server in HTTP mode

The HTTPS server is started by clicking on the button "start web server with SSL". The user can access the web page by inserting the following link in the web browser: https://localhost:900. Figure 25 displays the web page when started on HTTPS.

localhost:900/	× +		-		Х
\leftrightarrow \rightarrow C ² $\textcircled{0}$ $\textcircled{6}$ https:	://localhost:900	•••	V 1	☆ »	≡
E-Commerce					
Item Details:					
Amount:					
Credit Card Number:					
Buy Now					

Figure 25. Accessing server in HTTPS mode

TLS/SSL handshake is done with the server and the encryption mode being used is shown in Figure 26:

ship information.			
No	<u>\</u>	fiew Certific	cate <u>k</u> ies
No	Vie <u>w</u> Sa	ved Passwo	ords
S_128_GCM_SHA2 ig transmitted over e to view informatic his page as it travel	56, 128 bit ke the Internet. In traveling bet ed across the r	ys, TLS 1.2 tween ietwork.)
	ship information. No No S_128_GCM_SHA2 Ig transmitted over e to view informatic his page as it travel	ship information.	ship information. View Certifi No No View Coo No View Saved Passwo S_128_GCM_SHA256, 128 bit keys, TLS 1.2 Ig transmitted over the Internet. e to view information traveling between his page as it traveled across the network. Hel

Figure 26. HTTPS connection and encryption being used.

The Wireshark application allows a user to sniff packets over a network. First sniffing is done over the HTTP port and secondly on the HTTPS port. The information is intercepted and shown respectively.

Figures 27 and 28 describe the information when the network port was sniffed by Wireshark when a transaction was done. It shows clearly that the data are transmitted in plain text to the server. Anyone using a packet sniffer program may intercept the data.

localhost:800/	× +	-	-		ı ×
\leftrightarrow \rightarrow C ^I (i) localhost:800		••	•	☆	» =
E-Commerce					
Item Details: bag]				
Amount: 2					
Credit Card Number: 123456789000					
Buy Now					

Figure 27: Information input by a client

Apply a display filter	<ctrl-></ctrl->			 Expression.
o. Time	Source	Destnation	Protocol	Length Info
12 0.045383	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 2170 + 2171 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=5 Win=65003 Len=0
13 0.045413	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	86 2171 + 2170 [PSH, ACK] Seq=5 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1
14 0.045428	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 2178 + 2171 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6 Win=65002 Len=0
15 0.045463	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	86 2171 + 2170 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1
16 0.045473	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 2170 → 2171 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7 Win=65001 Len=0
17 0.045928	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	86 2171 + 2178 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1
18 0.045943	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 2170 → 2171 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=8 Win=65000 Len=0
19 0.045967	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	86 2171 + 2178 [PSH, ACK] Seq*8 Ack*1 Win*65535 Len*1
20 0.045975	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 2170 → 2171 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=9 Win=64999 Len=0
21 0.046098	111	:11	TCP	148 2224 + 800 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64800 Len=0 MSS=65475 WS
22 0.046123	1111	::1	TCP	148 800 = 2224 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win+65535 Len=0 M
23 0.046153	1 11	111	TCP	124 2224 → 800 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=529920 Len=0
24 0.046254	1 111	111	HTTP	1118 POST / HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
25 0.046264	111	::1	TCP	124 800 = 2224 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=498 Win=529920 Len=0
Frame 24: 1118 Null/Loopback Internet Proto Transmission C Hypertext Tran	ol Version 6, Src: : ontrol Protocol, Src : sfer Protocol	bits), 561 bytes capt :1, Dst: ::1 Port: 2224, Dst Port: x.uee.form.urlenroded	ured (4488 bi : 800, Seq: 1,	iti) on interface 0 , Ack: 1, Len: 497

Figure 28. Sniffing of client's information

From Figure 28, the program was able to sniff all the information.

The same information was used as for the HTTP server and was input on the webpage of the HTTPS server and the packets were sniffed and shown in Figure 29.

	🖌 "Npcap Loopback Adapter – 🗆 X									Х	
File	Edit	View G	io C	apture	Analyze	Statistics	Telephony	Wireless	Tools	Help	
	II <u>(</u>	•		2	۹ 👄 🗟	1	1 =	Q, Q, (Q 🎚		
	Apply a d	isplay filter	<(C)	rl-/>						🛋 🔹 Expressio	n +
No.		Time		Source			Destination		Protoco	Length Info	^
	12	0.012152		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	84 2281 → 2282 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=5 Win=65089 Len=0	
	13	0.012166		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	86 2282 + 2281 [PSH, ACK] Seq=5 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1	
	14	0.012173		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	84 2281 → 2282 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6 Win=65088 Len=0	
	15	0.012219		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	86 2282 + 2281 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1	
	16	0.012227		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	84 2281 → 2282 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7 Win=65087 Len=0	
	17	0.012265		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	86 2282 + 2281 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1	
	18	0.012275		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	84 2281 → 2282 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=8 Win=65086 Len=0	
	19	0.012322		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	86 2282 → 2281 [PSH, ACK] Seq=8 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1	-
	20	0.012331		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	84 2281 + 2282 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=9 Win=65085 Len=0	
Г	21	0.012563		::1			::1		TCP	148 2328 → 900 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64800 Len=0 MSS=65475 .	
	22	0.012595		::1			::1		TCP	148 900 → 2328 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0.	
T	23	0.012641		::1			::1		TCP	124 2328 → 900 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=529920 Len=0	
	24	0.012738		::1			::1		TCP	560 2328 → 900 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=529920 Len=.	
T	25	0.012748		::1			::1		TCP	124 900 → 2328 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=219 Win=529920 Len=0	
ł	26	0.012835		127.0	.0.1		127.0.0.1		TCP	86 2282 -> 2281 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1	- - -
_	[Che	ecksun St	atus	: Unve	rified]						^
	Unge	ent point	er:	0							
	✓ [SEC	Q/ACK ana	lysi	s]							
	1	[iRTT: 0.	0000	78000 :	seconds]						
	i	- [Bytes in	fli	ght: 2	18]						
	i	Bytes se	nt s	ince la	ast PSH f	lag: 218	8]				
	TCP	payload	(218	bytes)	-					- 1
v	Data (218 bytes	5)						1		
	Data	a: 160301	00d5	010000	10303905	477c751e	e8f6b93baca	8f979	6	 Data Encrypted 	
	[Ler	ngth: 218	1						1		
			-								V

Email Se	ander / Receiver	
Host name:	smtp.gmail.com	
Port Number:	587 Start TLS (True or False): true	
Usemame:	besd8504@gmail.com	
Password:	Message X	
To:	liessage sent Successfully	
Subject :		
Attachment :	C'IUsers'user/Desktoplecommerce.png	
Attachment Na	ecommerce.png	
Wessage :		
	this is a test	Intox

Figure 30. Sending an E-mail with javamail

Figure 29. Sniffing packets over HTTPS port

The program was able to sniff the port but the data is encrypted and not sent in plain text.

IV.2 E-mail Application Testing

The e-mail application is tested next. The GUI for the sender/receiver program, allows a user to send or receive an e-mail easily. To send an e-mail, the following steps are followed:

1. The hostname should be specified, for example if we are using G-mail, the hostname will be smtp.gmail.com for sending e-mail. The port number should be input. For g-mail, the port 587 is used to send e-mail over a TLS connection. The starttls extension may be set to either "true" or "false". This allows us to upgrade our connection using SSL/TLS.

2. The username and password should be entered correctly and set the destination e-mail address.

3. Add any attachment if necessary and type the message and click on mail to send the message. Figure 30 shows when an e-mail is sent using the G-mail e-mail provider.

After the e-mail is sent, a notification is sent to tell the user the e-mail is sent successfully. Now using the Wireshark packet sniffer, the data being sent are sniffed and shown in Figure 31.

	61 19.497922	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	60 Change Cipher Spec			
	62 19.797847	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 587 → 4036 [ACK] Seq=405 Ack=228 Win=44032 Len=0			
	63 19.797880	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	160 Encrypted Handshake Message, Application Data			
	64 20.002425	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 587 → 4036 [ACK] Seq=405 Ack=334 Win=44032 Len=0			
,	65 20.002925	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	315 Application Data			
	66 20.003258	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	128 Application Data, Application Data			
	67 20.299600	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	107 Application Data			
	68 20.299905	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	144 Application Data, Application Data			
	69 20.504803	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	107 Application Data			
	70 20.505153	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	144 Application Data, Application Data			
	71 20.801351	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 587 → 4036 [ACK] Seq=772 Ack=588 Win=44032 Len=0			
	72 20.801641	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	107 Application Data			
	73 20.802125	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	160 Application Data, Application Data			
	74 21.006702	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 587 → 4036 [ACK] Seq=825 Ack=694 Win=44032 Len=0			
	75 21.102416	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	123 Application Data			
	76 21.102737	192.168.100.6	173.194.76.109	TLSv1	160 Application Data, Application Data			
	77 21.307591	173.194.76.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	123 Application Data			
Content Type: Annlication Data (23)								
	Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)							
	Length: 32							
	Encrymted Application Data: c6cc8d57e92c2c43a8h3e53a583d81a68d1h7876fdr3c1ae							
	V TISUI Record Laver: Application Data Protocol: smtn							
	Content Type	Annlication Data (23)					
	CONTENT AND	• HODITCOCION DOLO N	6.71					

Figure 31. Wireshark capture on javamail

As shown in the Figure 31, a TLS handshake is started at the client side and all the data being sent are encrypted with the attachment also. Next the starttls will be set to false and when an e-mail via G-mail is sent, the output shown in Figure 32 is displayed.



Figure 32. Testing starttls false on gmail

As shown in Figure 32, the G-mail provider does not accept insecure connections. The e-mail was not sent and an error message is displayed. A TLS/SSL handshake must be issued to connect to the e-mail provider.

To receive an e-mail, the IMAP protocol is used to retrieve e-mails from the folders. The following steps are followed to open the e-mail:

1. Set the hostname, port number and starttls command according to the e-mail provider being used.

2. Input the username and password for correct authentication.

3. Click on the inbox button to display the messages. An example of the output is shown in Figure 33.



Next Wireshark is used to try to sniff packets when receiving an e-mail.

Figure 34 shows an extract of the output from the Wireshark software. It shows that the packets are encrypted and the TLS protocol is being used. If an attacker tries to sniff the packets, he will not be able to decrypt any information.

	v. IIIC	Junce	UCSUIGUUI	nuuuu	ceigur ann				
	19 9.591135	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	1466 Server Hello				
	20 9.591136	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	1375 Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done				
	21 9.591177	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TCP	54 16657 → 993 [ACK] Seq=166 Ack=2734 Win=66048 Len=0				
	22 9.612858	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TLSv1	129 Client Key Exchange				
	23 9.891458	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 993 → 16657 [ACK] Seq=2734 Ack=241 Win=44032 Len=0				
	24 9.891493	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TLSv1	113 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message				
	25 10.092614	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 993 → 16657 [ACK] Seq=2734 Ack=300 Win=44032 Len=0				
	26 10.094176	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	113 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message				
	27 10.094176	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	155 Application Data				
	28 10.094231	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TCP	54 16657 → 993 [ACK] Seq=300 Ack=2894 Win=66048 Len=0				
	29 10.097534	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TLSv1	107 Application Data				
	30 10.292913	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	299 Application Data				
	31 10.299618	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TLSv1	144 Application Data, Application Data				
	32 10.493601	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	91 Application Data				
	33 10.493951	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TLSv1	176 Application Data, Application Data				
	34 10.697924	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 993 → 16657 [ACK] Seq=3176 Ack=565 Win=44032 Len=0				
	35 11.095765	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TLSv1	363 Application Data				
	36 11.096259	192.168.100.6	74.125.133.109	TLSv1	144 Application Data, Application Data				
	37 11.296409	74.125.133.109	192.168.100.6	TCP	54 993 → 16657 [ACK] Seq=3485 Ack=655 Win=44032 Len=0				
5	Frame 27: 155 bytes	s on wire (1240 bits).	. 155 bytes captured	(1240 bit	s) on interface 0				
	Ethernet II, Src: H	luaweiTe f5:79:61 (4c	:1f:cc:f5:79:61), Dst	: Chicony	, E 3c:33:d6 (4c:bb:58:3c:33:d6)				
	Internet Protocol V	/ersion 4, Src: 74.12	5.133.109, Dst: 192.1	68.100.6	,				
	Transmission Contro	ol Protocol, Src Port:	: 993, Dst Port: 1665	7, Seq: 2	793, Ack: 300, Len: 101				
,	Secure Sockets Laye	er .							
	Y TLSv1 Record Layer: Application Data Protocol; imap								
	Content Type: Application Data (23)								
	Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Encrypted Output								
	Length: 96								
	Encrypted Application Data: ea96ad371a73ca03921552f3de9680c61d30c0592ca466b0								
	F	igure 34. Si	niffing pacl	kets v	when receiving mail				

As it can be seen from the previous testing, when the G-mail provider was used, we can see that both sending and receiving data are secured.

The application was also tested on an insecure e-mail service. The SMTP2GO was selected as it provides sending e-mails without the TLS protocol. The extract from Wireshark is given in Figure 35 with the startTLS command disabled while sending an email.

4 9.378559 287.58.142.223 192.168.386.5 TCP 66 25 + 5591 [5%, 46C] Sep-8 Adv1 Min-22080 Lem-8 V55-1422 540 5 9.378527 192.38.186.5 297.58.142.233 TCP 54 58391 + 25 [AC] Sep-8 Adv1 Min-6838 Lem-8 V55-1422 540 5 9.378527 192.38.186.5 297.58.142.233 TCP 54 58391 + 25 [AC] Sep-8 Adv1 Min-6838 Lem-8 V55-1422 540	X_PERM=1 NS=256
5 9.378627 192.168.108.5 207.58.142.213 TCP 54 58391 + 25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack+1 Min+66384 Len+0	
6 0 601127 107 50 141 112 100 160 5 CMTD 115 5, 110 and case 50070 5vin 4 67 No. 00 Top 2010 10.57	
0 5.051257 207.30.144.225 151.100.100.3 Shir 124 5. 220 Md11.5Hiptg0.Coll Child 4.07 Hull, 00 Jdl 2010 20.57	:45 +0000
7 9.681973 192.168.100.5 207.58.142.213 SMTP 68 C: EHLD user-pc	
8 9.973728 287.58.142.213 192.168.100.5 TCP 54 25 + 58391 [ACK] Seq=71 Ack=15 Win=29440 Len=0	
9 9.992377 207.50.142.213 192.160.100.5 SMTP 230 5: 250 mail.smtplgo.com Hello user-pc [41.136.124.157] 250 5	IZE 52428800 250 88ITMIME 250 DSNL
10 9.992724 192.168.108.5 287.58.142.213 SMTP 66 C: AUTH LOGEN	
11 10.890605 ChiconyE_3c:33:d6 Broadcast ARP 42 Who has 192.168.100.12 Tell 192.168.100.5	
12 18.892057 HuawelTe_f5:79:61 ChiconyE_3c:33:d6 ARP 42 192.155 400:1 is at 4c:1f:cc:f5:79:60	
13 10.273229 207.50.142.213 192.160.100.5 SMTP 72.5 334 Username:	
14 18.273372 192.168.188.5 287.58.142.213 SMTP 4 C: User: besd8584@shafeeq.com	ad Data
15 10.555519 207.50.142.213 192.160.100.5 SMTP 72 5: 334 Password: in all	de text
16 18.555787 192.168.188.5 287.58.142.213 SMTP 68 C: Pass: Viewsonic	III CEAL
17 10.846022 207.50.142.213 192.160.100.5 SMTP 84 5: 235 Authentication succeeded	
18 18.847814 192.168.108.5 207.58.142.213 SMTP 88 C: MAIL FROM: (besd8504@shafeeq.com)	
19 11.147212 207.50.142.213 192.160.100.5 SMTP 62 5: 250 OK	
20 11.147445 192.168.100.5 207.58.142.213 SMTP 80 C: RCPT TD: <shafeeq.skunk@gmail.com></shafeeq.skunk@gmail.com>	
21 11.441294 207.50.142.213 192.160.100.5 SMTP 🔊 250 Accepted (shafeeq.skunk@gmail.com)	
22 11.441422 192.168.108.5 207.58.142.213 SMTP 60 C: 541	
23 11.742825 287.58.142.213 192.168.108.5 SMTP 110 5: 354 Enter series and series in a line by itself	
24 11.743461 192.168.100.5 207.58.142.213 SMTP 1466 C: DATA fragment, 1412 bytes	
) Flace- Rolls (RCH 4/Y)	
Vindou cine velue: 153	
[fa]culated window size: 66048]	
[Vieles size calles fatter: 752]	
former and some former and	
4c 11 cc 15 79 61 4c bb 58 3c 33 d6 68 69 45 80 LyaL. XGE.	
1010 00 20 20 21 40 00 00 00 42 /2 (0 60 04 47) (1 26 00 04 02 (1 26 .0.0), 101,	
AND AN	
eesa <mark>er fa</mark> ed ea II.	

Figure 35. Disabling TLS on SMTP2GO

From Figure 35, the details are captured in plain text when the startTLS command was disabled and all the details such as the username and password were obtained.

When an email was sent using the same SMTP2GO e-mail service with TLS command enabled, the data that were sniffed are shown in Figure 36, In this case the data are encrypted.

				and the second second		surger and			
		25 9.892449	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	SMTP	64 C: STARTTLS			
		26 10.197869	287.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	SHTP	72 S: 220 TLS go ahead TLS Handshake started			
		27 10.248424	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TCP	54 2201 + 587 [ACK] Seq=25 Ack=266 Win=66048 Len=0			
		28 10.539995	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TLSv1	221 Client Hello			
		29 10.833078	287.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TLSv1	1466 Server Hello			
		30 10.833079	287.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TCP	1466 587 + 2201 [ACK] Seq=1678 Ack=192 Win=30464 Len=1412 [TCP segment of a reassembled POU			
		31 10.833079	287.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TLSv1	868 Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done			
		32 10.833139	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TCP	54 2201 + 587 [ACX] Seq=192 Ack=3984 Win=66384 Len=8			
		33 10.855508	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TLSv1	129 Client Key Exchange			
		34 11.169778	207.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TCP	54 587 + 2201 [ACK] Seq=3904 Ack=267 Win=30464 Len=0			
		35 11.169813	192.168.100.4	287.58.142.213	TLSv1	113 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message			
		36 11.447193	207.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TCP	54 587 + 2201 [ACK] Seq=3904 Ack=326 Win=30464 Len=0			
		37 11.447194	207.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TLSv1	113 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message			
		38 11.448564	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TLSv1	107 Application Data			
		39 11.726644	287.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TLSv1	251 Application Data			
	Ł	40 11.727278	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TLSv1	128 Application Data, Application Data			
		41 12.004466	287.58.142.213	192.168.100.4	TLSv1	107 Application Data			
		42 12.005049	192.168.100.4	207.58.142.213	TLSv1	160 Application Data, Application Data			
	c .								
			I free Lite						
	2 5	rame 41: 10/ byte	s on wire (856 bits), 10/ bytes captured	(856 bits)	on interface 0			
	2 5	thernet II, Src:	Huaweile_T5:/9:61 (4c:1f:cc:f5:/9:61), D	st: Chicony	t_SCISSION (4CIDDISHISCISSION)			
	21	nternet Protocol	Version 4, Src: 287	.58.142.213, Dst: 192	168.100.4				
	21) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 587, Ost Port: 2201, Seq: 4160, Ack: 453, Len: 53							
✓ Secure Sockets Layer									
		TLSV1 Record La	yer: Application Da	ta Protocol: smtp					
content type: Application Uata (23)									
Version: ILS I.W (Wobsel)									
		Length: 46							
	Encrypted Application Data: 050/55/94142/04/00144422017/08/9400ce9005010								

Figure 36. Testing SMTP2GO with TLS enabled

Spoofing attacks was tested with different email providers, to see whether the application is able to carry out spoofing attacks. Gmail and SMTP2GO were used for testing the spoofing attacks as shown in Figure 37.





A spoofing attack was carried out using the Gmail email provider. The 'From' field was changed to 'besd850494@gmail.com' as shown encircled in red in Figure 36. The e-mail was sent successfully with TLS set to true. Here the destination e-mail address is 'shafeeq.la123@gmail.com'. The next step, the inbox of the correspondent e-mail address is checked and shown in Figure 38.

	Email Sender / Receiver		
Host name:	imap.gmail.com	Start TLS (True or False) :	true
Port Number:	993	From:	
Username:	shafeeq.la123@gmail.com		
Password :	*****	Email Number 1 Subject: Test spoofing From: besd8504@gmail.co Message Hello	m
10.		Attachments .a.t	
Subject :			
Attachment :			
Attachment Na			
Message :			Inbox
		Mail	
	Figure 38 Check	ing inhov on G-m	ail

38. Checking inbox on G-n

The receiver received the e-mail successfully but the spoofed e-mail is immediately changed to the originating e-mail address. This shows carrying out spoofing attack on G-mail provider was unsuccessful.

2. Testing spoofing attack on SMTP2GO

A spoofing attack was carried out on SMTP2GO, where the originating e-mail was changed as encircled in red in Figure 39 and also TLS was disabled. The email was sent to 'besd.la@yahoo.com'. In the next step, the inbox of the recipient will be checked to see whether to see if the spoofed is received.



Checking Spoofed E-mail on SMTP2GO.

The originating e-mail received the message successfully and the attacked was not blocked when not using TLS. This clearly illustrates the weakness of not using SSL/TLS.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, an e-commerce and e-mail application were implemented in Java with and without the SSL/TLS protocol. For the e-commerce application, both an HTTP and HTTPS server were implemented. It was then shown how the HTTPS server could mitigate a MITM attack performed by Wireshark software. For the e-mail application, it was shown that secure e-mail providers like G-mail could easily prevent MITM and spoofing attack by using SSL/TLS. However, with some e-mail services such as SMTP2GO, it was possible to perform MITM and spoofing attacks. Spoofing attacks were tested in different e-mail providers and the TLS protocol successfully blocked sending spoofed emails on Gmail. While the relay service SMTP2GO could not mitigate the spoofing attack when the TLS protocol was not used. This paper therefore has provided a framework for testing the security of e-commerce and e-mail application by the use of Java, with relevant implementation details.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support of the University of Mauritius.

REFERENCES

- Anon. 2018. What is Ecommerce?. [ONLINE] Available at: <u>http://www.networksolutions.com/education/what-is-ecommerce/</u>. [Accessed 22 February 2018].
- [2] The RADICATI group, 2017-2021, Email Statistics Report.

[3] Statista. 2018. • *Global retail e-commerce sales 2014-2021 / Statistic*. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://www.statista.com/statistics/379046/worldwide-retail-ecommerce-sales/. [Accessed 03 April 2018].

[4] U.S. 2018. Hackers attack 20 million accounts on Alibaba's Taobao shopping site / Reuters. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alibaba-cyber/hackers-attack-

20-million-accounts-on-alibabas-taobao-shopping-site-

idUSKCN0VD14X. [Accessed 22 February 2018].

[5] SearchSecurity. 2018. *The importance of email encryption software in the enterprise*. [ONLINE] Available at:

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/The-importance-ofemail-encryption-software-in-the-enterprise.

[Accessed 25 February 2018].

[6] Er, P.K. and Er, G.K., 2017. Review of Role of SSL in Cyber Security. *International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science*, 8(4).

[7] Baumgäertner, L., Höchst, J., Leinweber, M. and Freisleben, B., 2015, August. How to Misuse SMTP over TLS: A Study of the (In) Security of Email Server Communication. In *Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA*, 2015 IEEE (Vol. 1, pp. 287-294). IEEE.

[8] Arshad, M. and Hussain, M.A., 2016. Secure Framework to Mitigate Man-in-the-Middle Attack over SSL Protocol. *Indian Journal of Science and Technology*, *9*(47).

[9] Shubh, T. and Sharma, S., 2016. Man-In-The-Middle-Attack Prevention Using HTTPS and SSL.

[10] Durumeric, Z., Adrian, D., Mirian, A., Kasten, J., Bursztein, E., Lidzborski, N., Thomas, K., Eranti, V., Bailey, M. and Halderman, J.A., 2015, October. Neither snow nor rain nor

MITM...: An empirical analysis of email delivery security. In *Proceedings of the 2015 Internet Measurement Conference*(pp. 27-39). ACM

[11] Jyer, R.P., Atrey, P.K., Varshney, G. and Misra, M., 2017, October. Email spoofing detection using volatile memory forensics. In *Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2017 IEEE Conference on* (pp. 619-625). IEEE.

[12] Xuan, J., Wang, D., Li, Z. and Zhang, S., 2016, October. Design of secure and independent controllable email system based on Identity-Based Cryptography. In *Computer and Communications (ICCC), 2016 2nd IEEE International Conference* on (pp. 217-222). IEEE.

[13] Hussain, M.A., 2013. A study of information security in ecommerce applications. *International Journal of Computer Engineering Science (IJCES)*, 3(3), pp.1-9.

[14] Fowdur, T.P. and Veerasoo, L., 2016, January. An email application with active spoof monitoring and control. In *Computer Communication and Informatics (ICCCI), 2016 International Conference on* (pp. 1-6). IEEE.

[15] History of SSL Certificate | When was SSL Certificate Introduced. 2018. *History of SSL Certificate | When was SSL Certificate Introduced*. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://www.evsslcertificate.com/ssl/ssl-history.html. [Accessed 28 February 2018].

[16] SearchSecurity. 2018. What is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)? - Definition from WhatIs.com. [ONLINE] Available at: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Advanced-

Encryption-Standard. [Accessed 28 February 2018].

[17] IBM Knowledge Center. 2018. IBM Knowledge Center. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSYKE2_7.1.0/ com.ibm.java.security.component.71.doc/security_

component/jsse2Docs/ssloverview.html.

[Accessed 17 March 2018].

[18] Andrew Peterson. 2018. *The myth of the sophisticated hack - O'Reilly Media*. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://www.oreilly.com/learning/the-myth-of-the-sophisticatedhack?log-out. [Accessed 07 April 2018].

[19] Techopedia.com. 2018. What is a Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM)? - Definition from Techopedia. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4018/man-in-the-middle-

attack-mitm. [Accessed 14 March 2018]. [20] Incapsula Team. 2018. MAN IN THE MIDDLE (MITM)

ATTACK. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/man-in-the-

middle-mitm.html. [Accessed 14 March 2018].

[21] Orebaugh, A., Ramirez, G. and Beale, J., 2006. Wireshark & Ethereal network protocol analyzer toolkit. Elsevier.

[22] Kaur, I., Kaur, H. and Singh, E.G., 2014. Analysing Various Packet Sniffing Tools. *International Journal of Electrical Electronics & Computer Science Engineering*, 1(5).

[23] Gupta, S., Singhal, A. and Kapoor, A., 2016, April. A literature survey on social engineering attacks: Phishing attack. In *Computing, Communication and Automation (ICCCA), 2016 International Conference on* (pp. 537-540). IEEE.

[24] Derouet, E., 2016. Fighting phishing and securing data with email authentication. *Computer Fraud & Security*, 2016(10), pp.5-8.

[25] IBM Knowledge Center Error. 2018. *IBM Knowledge Center Error*. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLTBW 2.1.0 /com.ibm.zos.v2r1.gska100/csdcwh.htm. [Accessed 21 March 2018].

[26] Harold, E.R., 2013. JavaMail API: Sending and Receiving Email with Java. " O'Reilly Media, Inc.".

[27] tutorialspoint.com. 2018. JavaMail API - Core Classes. [ONLINE] Available at:

https://www.tutorialspoint.com/javamail api/javamail api core cl asses.htm. [Accessed 18 March 2018].